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Italian and American Cooperative Efforts
to Reduce Heroin Trafficking: A Role
Model for the United States and Drug-
Supplying Foreign Nations
I. Introduction
During President Ronald Reagan's Administration, Americans
continuously heard the slogan from the White House "Just Say No
[to drugs]."' While the "Just Say No" campaign was aimed at rais-
ing awareness of the need to combat, through demand reduction, the
high level of American narcotics consumption, the United States
must also embark upon a concrete program to lower the large supply
of narcotics into America. 2 According to statistics, by 1987, approxi-
mately 95 % of the narcotics consumed in the United States came
from outside American borders.3 The large amount of illegal narcot-
ics entering the United States from foreign sources shows the enor-
mity of the demand for such drugs in this country. The influx of
illegal drugs, however, is not merely a demand-side problem; it is
I. National and International Security Threat of Narcotics Trafficking: Hearings on
S.961-1 Before the Senate Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 19
(1987) (hereinafter Int'l Security Threat] (statement of Benjamin Ward, Police Commissioner
for the City of New York). See also United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, reprinted in Message from The
President of the United States Transmitting S.385-4, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. iii-iv (1989)
[hereinafter Convention] (letter of transmittal from President George Bush to the United
States Senate). In President Bush's letter advising the Senate to ratify the Convention, the
President illustrates his recognition of the need to control the supply of drugs to correct the
drug addiction problem in the United States.
2. Int'l Security Threat, supra note I, at 19. Even though some experts place an empha-
sis on demand reduction through prevention and education as the eventual solution to the drug
problem, other commentators also recognize the need to stop the "flood of illegal drugs" enter-
ing the United States. International Drug Enforcement Act: Hearings on H.781-15 (H.R.
5310-The International Drug Traffic Enforcement Act of 1986) Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 53 (1986) (statement
of the Honorable Wyche Fowler, Jr., Representative from Georgia advocating a supply-side
solution to the drug problem). For views on the demand-side solution, see Review of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Strategy Report-Midyear Update: Hearings on H.381-11 Before
the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1987) and The Worldwide Drug
Situation and Int'l Narcotics Control Programs: Hearings on H.381-53 Before the Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1987) [hereinafter Worldwide Drug Situation]
(statement of the Honorable David L. Westrate, Assistant Administrator for Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration).
3. Status Report on GAO's Worldwide Review of Narcotics Control Programs: Hear-
ings on H.381-1 Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1987) (state-
ment of Joseph E. Kelley, Associate Director, National Security and Int'l Affairs Division,
U.S. General Accounting Office).
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also a supply-side problem. The commendable efforts to reduce the
demand for drugs in the United States should not lead us to ignore
the fact that in order to deal effectively with the drug problem, the
supply of imported narcotics also must be lowered and eventually
eliminated. The American and Italian governments' joint efforts to
reduce heroin exportation to and consumption in the United States is
an illustrative case of how substance abuse has been attacked from
the supply side.
Because the amount of heroin imported into the United States
had begun to rise significantly in the 1980s from originally moder-
ately low levels in the mid-to-late-1970s, the heroin flow into this
country is an excellent example of an American narcotics control
problem which needed to be solved.4 During the first half of the
1980s, a major source of such heroin imported into the United States
was, undisputedly, the Sicilian Mafia which "control[led] not only
the importation but also the distribution networks for heroin." 5 A
description of the Sicilian Mafia's attempts to transport heroin to the
United States and of the American and Italian governments' efforts
to stop such illegal drug trafficking, illustrates a program which
proved to be successful in combatting international narcotics traffick-
ing in this isolated instance of inter-governmental cooperation.
Though this success has been largely overshadowed in the news me-
dia by Columbia's continued shipments of cocaine to the United
States, the American/Italian response to the Sicilian Mafia heroin
problem remains a viable solution. Furthermore, the success of the
American and Italian program, as well as the continuing influx of
drugs into the United States from other foreign countries, suggest
that the United States should use this program as a role model to
slow down, if not halt, the importation of drugs.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the role of the Sicil-
ian Mafia in transporting heroin to the United States as well as to
evaluate the combined efforts of the American and Italian govern-
ments in their attempt to end the heroin problem.' Section II will
4. The Sicilian Connection: Southwest Asian Heroin En Route to the United States:
Hearings on S.382-23 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). (Senator Joseph Biden, based on his April 1980 study
mission to Turkey, Greece, and Italy, states that by 1980 Southwest Asia supplied large
amounts of heroin to the United States and that such levels had not been prevalent in this
country since the French sent massive amounts of heroin to the United States in the early
1970s.) See also Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 66 (Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) National Drug Strategy Report reveals that, during the 1980s, Mexico has increased its
shipments of heroin to the United States).
5. Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 66 (statement from the FBI National Drug
Strategy Report).
6. This Comment's concentration on the Sicilian Mafia's efforts to export heroin to the
United States does not mean to imply that all of the Mafia's heroin is sent to the United
States. The Mafia's heroin which remains and is consumed in Italy is not within the scope of
this Comment. For information on heroin use and addiction in Italy, which is the leading drug
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explore the background of the Mafia heroin shipments to the United
States, including the Mafia's method of transporting heroin into
America and the impact of trafficking such large amounts of heroin.
Section III will examine the cooperative programs such as delega-
tions and the bilateral treaty between Italy and the United States,
and will evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts. Finally, Section IV
will discuss the needs for and the benefits of utilizing the Italian-
American program as a role model in combatting the international
drug trafficking problems between other countries and the United
States.
II. Background of the Sicilian Mafia's Exportation of Heroin to the
United States
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Sicilian Mafia
established its own international network for the distribution of to-
bacco.7 This network consisted of laboratories to process the tobacco,
and contacts that the Mafia set up in the various countries to sell the
tobacco, to collect the proceeds, and to send the money back to the
Mafia.8 Tobacco selling was very appealing to the Sicilian Mafia be-
cause such business was extremely profitable at the time. When the
Mafia realized that it could make more money by selling heroin than
by smuggling tobacco, it began to use the tobacco network scheme
for the production and sale of heroin.9
Within this international heroin network, the Sicilian Mafia
bought the morphine base product from the Asian countries of Iran,
Afghanistan, and Turkey and shipped the product to secret refining
laboratories in Italy."0 After the Organization refined the morphine
base into heroin, the Mafia sent the heroin to the Group's contacts in
the United States. 1 In the 1960s, the Sicilian Mafia sent several of
its members to the United States for the sole purpose of "coordinat-
abuse problem in that country, see generally International Narcotics Control Study Mission
to Italy: Hearings on H.962-7 Before the Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1984) [hereinafter Int'l Narcotics Control].
7. Int'l Security Threat. supra note 1, at 32 (statement from the Honorable Giovanni
Falcone, Magistrate of Palermo, Italy).
8. Id. at 32, 34. The chart illustrating the Sicilian Mafia's distribution network for the
sale of heroin in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s has the same general,
principal structure as the earlier distribution network for the sale of tobacco. Id.
9. Organized Crime Activities and Law Enforcement Response-25 Years After
Valachi: Hearings on S.401-14 Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1988) [hereinafter Organized
Crime Activities] (statement of Tommaso Buscetta, former member of the Porto Nuova Sicil-
ian Mafia Family, Palermo, Sicily). The Sicilian Mafia is also referred to as the Organization
and the Group in this Comment.
10. Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Mr. Freeh, investigator in
the Sicilian Mafia's trafficking of heroin into the United States).
I1. Id.
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ing the importation of heroin."' 2 Upon receiving the refined heroin,
these contacts sold it in the United States, collected the payment in
bills of small denominations, and laundered the money through
American investment firms. 13 The money travelled to Switzerland
and then back to Italy, where the Sicilian Mafia took the money and
used some of these funds to pay back the countries who originally
supplied the morphine base product."'
The success of this international heroin network scheme can be
shown in an early 1980s investigation referred to only as the Pizza
Connection Case by congressional hearing witnesses.15 During the
early 1980s, the Mafia collected approximately $60 million in pro-
ceeds from heroin sales in the United States, one-third of which was
laundered through two major American investment firms."6 Between
March and April 1982, one of the firms became suspicious when
people began walking in with suitcases filled with cash that totalled
$4.9 million in fives, tens, and twenties of "dirty, dog-eared
money"17 taken in from heroin sales. 8 Consequently, in April 1982,
besides reporting the incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the firm also "politely and firmly"' 9 asked Della Torre, one of
the Sicilian Mafia's contacts in the United States who was launder-
ing the drug money through the first firm, to take his business to
another firm.20 Upon transferring the account to a second major in-
vestment house, the Sicilian Mafia passed approximately $15.6 mil-
lion in cash through this second firm to the Mafia's Swiss bank
account."
In September 1982, the FBI and the United States Customs
Service "discovered that Della Torre was depositing that $15.6 mil-
lion into these accounts at [the second firm]" 22 during their investi-
gation resulting from the first firm's tip. Despite being served a sub-
poena from the United States Attorney's Office requesting
information on these accounts and a non-disclosure letter ordering
the second firm not to notify the client that the government was ac-
tively investigating the matter, the second firm "immediately notified
the client in Switzerland. 23 After $60 million worth of heroin en-
tered the United States from Italy between 1980 and 1984 in the
12. Id.
13. Id. at 35-36.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 33.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 36.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36-37.
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Pizza Connection Case, thirty-five defendants were eventually con-
victed.2' Although only some defendants were actually convicted in
the Pizza Connection Case, this particular operation reveals that the
Sicilian Mafia's international heroin network was highly sophisti-
cated. Only a well-managed scheme could have enabled the Mafia to
transport such a large amount of heroin into the United States over
a long period of time.
Two factors in particular-the help of La Cosa Nostra (LCN),
the American Mafia, and the Sicilian Mafia's use of intimida-
tion-allowed the Sicilian Mafia to set up a complex international
scheme to transport heroin into the United States. A Sicilian Mafia
member stated:
it would be impossible ...for the Sicilian Mafia to run drug
traffic involving hundreds of kilos of cocaine or heroin in the
United States without the local Mafia knowing about it because
in order to sell it here [in the United States] they would have to
have authorization and consent from the local Mafia. This is the
way all of the Mafia activities are operated between one country
and another. You have to have the authorization and blessing of
the local Mafia.25
If any member of the Sicilian Mafia attempted to traffic heroin in
the United States without the consent of the local Mafia, the
Sicilians would be subject to punishment, including death. 26 Thus,
the local Mafia's consent and authorization of the Sicilian Mafia's
trafficking heroin to the United States contributed to the Sicilian
Mafia's ability to pursue its illegal activity in this country.
Furthermore, the Mafia used death and intimidation to prevent
opponents from giving information to law enforcement officials that
would be damaging to the Organization. According to a confirmed
Sicilian Mafia member, there were "over 400 Mafia killings in Pa-
lermo, [Italy]" 2' 7 between 1981 and 1983. These killings served two
purposes. First, such killings disposed of anyone who had sufficient
knowledge of the Organization's activities and who showed a desire
or an inclination to give such information to law enforcement au-
thorities. Second, the killings served as a reminder to anyone who
contemplated revealing the Mafia's activities to the authorities that
such admissions would lead to his own murder. Thus, the deadly and
intimidating actions of the Mafia as well as the LCN's consent to
the Sicilian Mafia's heroin trafficking efforts allowed the Sicilian
24. Id. at 35. See also Organized Crime Activities, supra note 9, at 49.
25. Organized Crime Activities, supra note 9, at 58 (statement of Tommaso Buscetta,
Sicilian Mafia member).
26. Id. at 59.
27. Id. at 54 (statement of Tommaso Buscetta, Sicilian Mafia member).
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Mafia the opportunity to use its elaborate international network to
transport heroin to the United States.
Precisely when this heroin trafficking began is uncertain. Many
of the older members of the Sicilian Mafia Family believe that the
Organization did not change its primary business from tobacco
smuggling to heroin trafficking "until about 1977 or 1978."'28 How-
ever, some evidence suggests that the Sicilian Mafia has been smug-
gling illegal drugs into the United States since the 1920s when the
Organization began smuggling tobacco. 9 Additional evidence indi-
cates that the Mafia was able to obtain large amounts of heroin from
French sources to ship to the United States between 1950 and
1972.30 The evidence, based on congressional studies of historical
data indicating earlier origins of heroin smuggling into the United
States, is more persuasive than testimony from older Mafia members
who try to place the blame on the younger members. Despite the
dispute as to the precise date of commencement, the two opposing
views can be reconciled to some extent. While heroin from France
dropped off in the early 1970s, the Sicilian Mafia could have begun
in the late 1970s to traffic heroin again to the United States. How-
ever, the more recent shipments contained heroin whose base prod-
ucts originated in Southwest Asia,31 not France.
Thus, by utilizing laboratories and foreign contacts established
from earlier tobacco smuggling activities and by setting up new and
additional contacts in the international narcotics trafficking scheme,
the Sicilian Mafia was able to begin shipping heroin, whose raw
product originated in Southwest Asia, to the United States in the
1970s. The Sicilian Mafia's total commitment to drug trafficking re-
sulted in high volumes of heroin imported into the United States. By
1979 or 1980, "well over 50 percent of the heroin coming into the
[United States] came through the Sicilian connection, and some of
the American organized crime families. '3 2 By the early 1980s, it was
evident that something had to be done to correct this problem.
III. Evaluation of Cooperation Between the American and Italian
Governments
Despite these on-going drug trafficking activities between Italy
28. Id. at 59. Angelo Lonardo, former Underboss of the Cleveland Cosa Nostra (La
Cosa Nostra is the American Mafia Family) corroborated Buscetta's approximate date of the
beginning of the Sicilian Mafia's heroin trafficking when Lonardo said that LCN started deal-
ing with narcotics in the "late sixties or seventies" when greedy younger Family members went
"into narcotics without the knowledge of the Families." Id. at 84, 91, and 92.
29. Int'l Narcotics* Control, supra note 6, at 195 (statement from the House Select
Committee's report based on the Committee's visit to Italy).
30. Id.
31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32. Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 28.
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and the United States, a problem which is not as highly publicized in
the news media as the drug trafficking problems with Columbia and
other South American countries, the governments of both Italy and
the United States have been making efforts to stop the illegal activ-
ity. Specifically, officials from both governments have met to discuss
the ways in which their countries can work together to effectively
combat the heroin trafficking problem. The International Narcotics
Control Study Mission to Italy in 1984 illustrates the high degree of
commitment by both countries to a joint effort aimed at ending the
Mafia's heroin trafficking scheme.33 Furthermore, the two govern-
ments have also signed a bilateral treaty that includes stringent pro-
visions to prosecute drug traffickers. " Finally, the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has continuously helped
the Italian law enforcement authorities find members of the culpable
organization, the Sicilian Mafia, who are engaged in the transporta-
tion of heroin to the United States. 35 Thus, a variety of specific
events illustrate extensive collaboration exhibited between the two
countries.
A. An Historical Perspective of Italian-American Cooperation
The Italian and American governments have historically en-
joyed a strong common commitment to working together to solve the
heroin trafficking problem faced by both nations. No recorded date
of the first incidence of cooperation between the two countries,
though, exists. For example, the first time American and Italian offi-
cials discussed the possibility of sending American investigators to
Italy to help the Italian law enforcement authorities find drug traf-
fickers and gather sufficient evidence to prosecute such violators of
the law is not known. However, Italian-American cooperation most
likely began to increase significantly during the late 1970s or the
very beginning of the 1980's when both the Italian and American
governments were discovering that the Sicilian Mafia was transport-
ing unprecedented amounts of heroin into the United States.3"
33. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
36. Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 30-31. Giovanni Falcone, Magistrate of Pa-
lermo, Italy, revealed to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control that while
"American authorities in the United States ... [were taking] a close look at Mafia members
whose roots and whose activities could be traced back to the Mafia in Sicily, . . . Italian
authorities in Sicily were conducting a series of negotiations having to do with Mafia activi-
ties." Id. at 30.
Thus, at the same time American authorities were investigating the people in the United
States connected with the Sicilian Mafia, the Italian authorities were uncovering "the move-
ment of narcotics, certain laboratories for the refinery of narcotics . . . in Sicily." Id. at 31.
The Italian and American governments then determined that the complexity of the Sicilian
Mafia operation demanded that they work together. Id.
Spring 1990]
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Two specific events involving the Italian and American govern-
ments illustrate the high level of commitment existing between both
nations. First, in 1984, four members of the House Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control and four other Members of Con-
gress visited Italian officials in Italy for two days to discuss the ex-
tent of the two countries' heroin trafficking problem at that time,
and the ways in which both nations might work together to combat
the problem. 37 Specifically, officials from both countries discussed
the need for American assistance in the "use of undercover police
officers in obtaining evidence of drug trafficking; witness protection
services; and the use of controlled deliveries of illegal narcotics to
purchasers." 38 Thus, in the mid-1980's, both governments continued
to work together to develop effective methods of cooperation that
would help the two nations combat the heroin trafficking problem.
Second, during the Select Committee's visit to Italy in 1984,
Italian and American officials discussed the establishment of a "joint
cabinet-level committee on narcotics and organized crime." 39 Within
this committee, the United States Attorney General "will head the
[American] delegation, '40 and the Italian Minister of the Interior
will be in charge of the Italian group. 1 The Italian Minister of the
Interior and Vice Prime Minister expressed their desire to create an
effective program that would allow the committee members an op-
portunity to study the effectiveness of the joint effort and the need
for any changes."2 Both nations, therefore, had the goal of creating a
decision-making committee rather than simply a discussion group. 3
Unfortunately, recent congressional hearing reports are devoid of in-
formation concerning any successes this joint cabinet-level commit-
tee has achieved.
Although Italian-American cooperative efforts were prevalent
from the late 1970s or early 1980s, the extent of collaboration ap-
pears to have leveled off by the mid-1980s. No new bilateral treaties
or agreements have been signed between the two countries. Further-
more, any new congressional legislation regarding American efforts
to combat drug trafficking problems with foreign countries does not
include Italy. For example, even though the International Coopera-
tion Act of 1989 calls for American assistance to many Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries and even to some European countries,
37. Int'l Narcotics Control, supra note 6, at 111, 120.
38. Id. at 193 (statement of Italian Justice Minister Mino Martinazzoli).
39. Id. at 121.
40. Id. at 187.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Int'l Narcotics Control, supra
note 6, at 192.
43. Id. (statement of the Italian Minister of the Interior Luigi Scalfaro).
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the Act does not mention Italy as a recipient of American assis-
tance." ' Thus, no new cooperative programs have been exercised be-
tween the two countries, perhaps because the early to mid-1980s pro-
grams and agreements, having proved successful in combatting the
heroin trafficking problem from Italy to the United States, do not
necessitate any additional programs."
B. Analysis of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Italy
On November 9, 1982, the United States signed the Mutual Le-
gal Assistance Treaty (Treaty) with Italy." Less then two years
later, in mid-1984, the two nations' legislative bodies ratified the
Treaty.47 By 1985, the Treaty was in force."' This Treaty, which is
not only desirable as a method for combatting international heroin
traffickers but is also a legal document, contains two major
innovations."'
1. Constitutionality of the Compulsion-of- Witnesses Provi-
sion.-Article 15 of the Treaty provides that:
upon request, a requested country is obligated to obtain an order
compelling a person to appear and testify in a proceeding in the
requesting country if: the requested country has no reasonable
basis for denying the request; the person's testimony could be
compelled in connection with an investigation or proceeding be-
ing conducted by that country in similar circumstances; and the
Central Authority of the requesting country certifies that the
person's testimony is relevant and material.50
A requesting country is the state submitting the request for compul-
44. Foreign Aid Programs: Hearings on H.383-6 (H.R. 2655-International Coopera-
tion Act of 1989) Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. ii-v (1989)
[hereinafter Int'l Cooperation Act].
45. See infra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
46. See Treaty with the Italian Republic on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters:
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Treaty Document 98-25 to the
U.S. Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. ii (1984). See also UNPUBLISHED AND UNNUMBERED TREA-
TIES INDEX 1988, at 84 (1989) [hereinafter UNPUBLISHED TREATIES]. See also Nadelmann,
Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 467. 494 (1985) [here-
inafter Nadelmann].
47. Nadelmann, supra note 46, at 494.
48. The Treaty has been in force since 1985, except for article 18, para. 2 which has not
yet been adopted. UNPUBLISHED TREATIES, supra note 46, at 84.
49. Article 15 of the Treaty allows for the compulsion of witnesses for testimonial pur-
poses and article 18, the forfeiture clause, enables each country to freeze assets which are
planned to be given to the other country for the investigations and prosecutions of illegal drug
trafficking cases. Legislation Aimed at Combatting International Drug Trafficking and Money
Laundering (S.962-4): Staff Report for the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1987).
50. Legislation Aimed at Combatting International Drug Trafficking and Money Laun-
dering (S.962-4): Executive Report on Mutual Legal Assistance with Italy Before the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 186, 194 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Executive Report].
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sion of appearances of witnesses. A requested country is the nation
which receives the request and who must then "issue subpoenas,
search warrants, and other orders necessary to the execution of a
request."" If the three preconditions of article 15 are met, the re-
quested state would be required to compel its citizen-witness to tes-
tify in the requesting state even if the witness does not consent.52 If,
however, "a witness . . . fails to appear pursuant to such an order,
. .. [he or she] is subject to the same sanctions under the laws of
the requested country as would be applicable if that witness failed to
appear in a criminal proceeding in that country." 3 Such a witness is
not subject to any legal sanctions of the requesting country.54
An inherent problem exists in the Treaty's sanction provisions.
Under the current Treaty, a witness who fails to testify in a request-
ing country's drug enforcement proceeding can be punished accord-
ing to the laws of his own nation but cannot be sanctioned by the
requesting country. Consequently, a situation could conceivably arise
in which American and Italian witnesses who fail to testify in the
other country's proceedings actually receive disproportionate
sentences. For example, an American witness who refuses to testify
in an Italian proceeding may, under American laws, incur a stiffer
penalty than an Italian witness who fails to testify in an American
court, would incur under Italian law. To account for this potential
disparity in sanctions due to dissimilar laws and legal systems in
each of the two countries, the Treaty should have provided a stipu-
lated set of uniform sanctions applicable to any citizen who refuses
to testify in the other country's proceedings. In this way, witnesses
who refuse to testify would receive the same punishment, regardless
of their nationality.
Moreover, the current Treaty stipulates that not only is a for-
eign witness who refuses to testify immune from sanctions of a re-
questing country, such a witness actually has specific rights against
the requesting country.55 Article 17 of the Treaty specifically man-
dates that:
a person appearing before an authority in the requesting country
pursuant to a request may not be sued civilly in, or be detained
by, the requesting country for any act or conviction which pre-
ceded departure from the requested country (except insofar as
such person was in custody in the requested country and was
transferred pursuant to Article 16)." e
51. Id. at 189.
52. Nadelmann, supra note 46, at 194.
53. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 194.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 195.
56. Id.
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Because a foreign witness who refuses to testify in a requesting coun-
try's drug enforcement proceeding is not subject to sanctions in that
nation and also has the right not to be sued civilly in or be detained
by that nation, a refusing witness unjustly appears to have more
rights against the requesting country than that state has against the
witness. If a requested country has laws which are not very stringent,
a citizen-witness may decide that that penalty is worth not testifying
in the requesting country, especially because the witness cannot be
sued in or be detained by the requesting state. Therefore, along with
providing a uniform set of sanctions for Italy and the United States
to use against their citizens who fail to testify in the other country's
proceedings, the Treaty should also have given the foreign witness
some incentive to testify in the other country. With the addition of
such provisions, two immediate defects in the Treaty can be
corrected.
(a) United States Constitution.-Despite the inherent problems
with the compulsion-of-witnesses provision in the Treaty, this provi-
sion is constitutional in the United States. The drafters of the Ital-
ian-American Treaty based article 15 on their desire to provide "a
country investigating and/or prosecuting a serious criminal offense
with the ability to obtain the compulsory appearance and testimony,
before its grand juries and courts, of witnesses located in foreign
countries. '5 7 In New York v. O'Neill, the United States Supreme
Court upheld Florida's Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceed-
ings,58 and ruled that the concept of compulsory appearance at the
interstate level is constitutional.5 9
The O'Neill reasoning for upholding the constitutionality of wit-
ness compulsion on the interstate level is applicable to a similar
mandatory requirement on the international level.6 0 First, because
the Treaty, like the interstate compulsory witness requirement, re-
quires only a temporary restriction on freedom of movement which is
outweighed by the authorization of reciprocal ability of witness com-
pulsion, the Treaty is constitutional under the United States Consti-
tution. The Supreme Court ruled in O'Neill that the obligation to go
to another state to give testimony operates as a restriction on the
exercise of the claimed constitutional right "to ingress and egress
[which] is a privilege of national citizenship protected by the Four-
57. Id.
58. Cited in New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
59. The Court ruled that an Illinois citizen attending a convention in Florida could be
transported to New York to testify in a grand jury proceeding in New York. New York v.
O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 3, 11, 12 (1959).
60. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 195.
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teenth Amendment." 6' However, the Court reasoned that the type of
freedom to travel involved in O'Neill was not even "freedom of
travel in its essential sense""2 because it represents only "a tempo-
rary interference with voluntary travel ... [especially] so in an era
of jet transportation when vast distances can be traversed in a mat-
ter of hours." 63 Thus, in upholding the constitutionality of the com-
pulsion of witnesses on an interstate basis in O'Neill, the Supreme
Court ruled that a witness' obligation to testify in any American
state is a temporary, but valid, restriction On the witness' freedom to
choose which state he enters and exits.
In the Italian-American Treaty, the inconvenience that Ameri-
can citizens might suffer by being compelled to travel to Italy to
testify in Italian proceedings is "not significantly different"'" from
the restriction on American citizen's freedom to choose which state
to travel to and when to enter and leave that state.65 Just as the
obligation to testify is a valid restriction on freedom of movement on
the interstate level, such an obligation is also a bona fide restriction
on freedom of movement on the international level. However, the
inconvenience of travel restrictions for American citizen-witnesses is
more than offset by the "reciprocal ability of the United States to
obtain the compelled appearance and testimony of a noncitizen or
nonresident witness in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in the United States-an ability which will further en-
hance the fairness of United States criminal trials."6 6 Therefore, on
an international basis, the compulsion of American citizens to testify
in Italian criminal proceedings is a temporary, but valid, interference
with movement and is offset by the compulsion of Italian citizens to
testify in the United States.
The second basis for constitutionality of article 15's stipulation
of compulsory appearance of witnesses is the Treaty's provision of
more due process rights to witnesses than the United States' inter-
state compulsory witness role. This foundation allows the Treaty to
remain a document which is constitutional according to the United
States Constitution. In upholding the constitutionality of compulsory
witness appearance on an interstate basis, the Supreme Court in
O'Neill ruled that although a witness may be compelled to testify in
a state of which he is not a resident, that witness will be given "pro-
cedural due process in the hearing itself .... and this is firmly
61. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959).
62. id. at 7.
63. Id.
64. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 196.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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established. 67
The Italian-American Treaty grants testifying citizens even
more due process guarantees than does the interstate compulsory
witness requirement.6 8 For example, both the interstate-compulsory-
witness requirement and the Treaty allow such compulsion orders to
be dismissed if the orders are unreasonable and oppressive, and both
grant safe conduct to testifying witnesses in the requesting country
or American state.69 Although the interstate compulsory witness re-
quirement does not go any further, the Treaty additionally grants
witnesses immunity for "any truthful testimony given in the request-
ing country pursuant to a request. ' 70 Thus, because the Supreme
Court found no violation of due process rights under Florida's inter-
state-compulsory-witness requirement, the present Treaty between
the United States and Italy, which grants even more due process
protection than what the Supreme Court upheld on the interstate
level, provides "sufficient protections to such persons to meet the due
process standards enunciated by the . ..Court in O'Neill.""'
Third, the Treaty is constitutional because, just as in the inter-
state-compulsory-witness requirement, a presumption of constitution-
ality exists. In O'Neill, the Supreme Court ruled that a presumption
of constitutionality of compulsion of witnesses on an interstate level
existed since there was no specific "constitutional provision granting
him [a testifying citizen] relief from this obligation to testify even
though he must travel to another State to do sO.'172 This presumption
is applicable to the Treaty's international compulsory-witness provi-
sion because,
unless the Constitution clearly prevents United States courts
from ordering persons to travel to Italy at the expense of the
Italian government to appear and testify, under guarantees of
safe conduct and immunity, in connection with a criminal inves-
tigation or proceeding in Italy, Article 15 is a constitutional
grant of power.7 3
Therefore, because the United States Constitution does not expressly
prohibit the United States from compelling American citizens to tes-
tify in criminal proceedings in Italy, the provision is not unconstitu-
tional.7 ' The three reasons outlined above show that the international
compulsion of witnesses for testimonial purposes is constitutional in
67. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 8 (1959).
68. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 196.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11 (1959).
73. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 196.
74. Id.
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the United States.
(b) Italian Constitution.-In Italy, the international compulsion
of witnesses for testimonial purposes is also constitutional pursuant
to the Constitution of the Republic of Italy.75 First, under the Italian
Constitution, the Treaty validly and only temporarily restricts free-
dom of movement.76 Article 3 of the Italian Constitution provides
that "[I]t shall be the task of the Republic to remove obstacles ...
restricting in practice the freedom . . . of citizens."' 7 In allowing the
Italian Government to restrict the freedom of its citizen-witnesses by
forcing them to go to the United States to testify in criminal pro-
ceedings, the Treaty initially appears to be violative of article 3. As
in the case of the United States, however, the Treaty does not violate
an Italian citizen's right to freedom under the Italian Constitution
because such a restriction is only temporary and is offset by the re-
ciprocal ability of the Italian Government to compel American wit-
nesses to testify in Italy.78
Second, under the Italian Constitution, the Treaty provides the
due process rights necessary to make the Treaty constitutional. Arti-
cle 13 of the Italian Constitution stipulates that "there shall be no
form of detention, inspection, or search of the person, nor any other
restriction whatsoever of personal liberty . . . [without the decision
of] the judicial authorities . . . [as] prescribed by law."'79 Although
the Treaty, at first, appears to contravene this article by allowing
Italian citizens to be detained in the United States while they testify,
the Treaty does not infringe upon the rights granted to Italian citi-
zens by article 13. This article allows Italian judicial authorities,
with legal justification, to detain Italian citizens." By the same to-
ken, Italian authorities have legal jurisdiction to compel Italian wit-
nesses to testify in American courts concerning illegal narcotics traf-
fickers to promote a safer world which is less corrupted by the flow
of illegal drugs across transnational borders.
Third, the Italian Constitution presumes constitutionality. Be-
cause there is no specific provision in the Italian Constitution which
prohibits Italian citizen-witnesses from being compelled to testify in
American drug enforcement proceedings, a presumption of constitu-
tionality of the compulsion-of-witnesses provision in the Treaty
75. COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (Italy), reprinted in M. CAPPELLETTI, THE ITALIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 281 (1967).
76. This interpretation of the Italian Constitution is not intended to be a thorough inves-
tigation of the document, but simply an analysis of selected provisions. See infra notes 77-80
and accompanying text.
77. COST., art. 3.
78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
79. COST., art. 13.
80. Id.
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arises. Therefore, for the three reasons outlined above, the Treaty's
allowance for compulsion of witnesses pursuant to article 15 is con-
stitutional under Italian law.
2. Provisions of the Treaty's Forfeiture Clause.-The second
major innovative program of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
with Italy is embodied in article 18. Article 18, paragraph 1 gives
both Italy and the United States the right, in exigent circumstances,
to freeze assets "in a requested country which are subject to forfei-
ture to the requesting country."'" Paragraph 2 stipulates that "such
assets [are] to be forfeited to the requesting country pursuant to the
laws of the requested country."82 The importance of article 18 is that
it provides the United States and Italy with the opportunity to de-
prive "international drug traffickers and members of organized crime
of the fruits of their criminal activity and of the means to finance
further criminal activities."83
Although the Treaty has been in effect since 1985, article 18,
paragraph 2 has not been adopted.84 This failure of ratification
leaves open the choice of law question of which country's law will be
applied to forfeit assets in a requested country to a requesting coun-
try. Despite the inherent problems in articles 15 and 18 of the
Treaty, these highlighted provisions illustrate the Italian and the
American commitment to working together to combat effectively
through innovative measures the heroin trafficking problem existing
between the two countries.
C. Increased Scope of Activities of Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) Personnel in Italy
By January 31, 1987, DEA had in its employ a total of eleven
Americans-seven special agents and four other employees-in It-
aly. 85 Out of the forty-four countries to which the DEA sends em-
ployees, Italy has the sixth largest number of DEA personnel.86
These figures indicate that not only does the United States believe
Italy to be a major source of the international drug trafficking prob-
81. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 197.
82. Id
83. Id.
84. UNPUBLISHED TREATIES, supra note 46, at 84. Article 18 is the only provision of the
Treaty that was required to be ratified separately after the adoption of the Treaty.
Nadelmann, supra note 46, at 494. In 1985, both countries anticipated reaching "a resolution
of the problem [of adoption of article 18] in the near future." Id. As of 1988, however, article
18, para. I is in force but para. 2 remains unadopted. UNPUBLISHED TREATIES, supra note 46,
at 84.
85. Worldwide Drug Situation, supra note 2, at 95. In a list of DEA employees in other
foreign countries, Mexico ranks the highest with 51 DEA personnel, followed by Thailand with
44, Columbia with 29, Pakistan with 19, and Bolivia with 14. Id.
86. Id.
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lem, but also that the DEA personnel in Italy must be working with
the Italian government to try to combat this international crisis.
DEA's role in Italy is primarily a supportive one. Historically,
DEA has provided "expert advice and authorized investigative intel-
ligence and training assistance"87 to Italy. Specifically, DEA person-
nel train Italian law enforcement officers "in the areas of drug inves-
tigations [and] drug identification. '8 8 Furthermore, DEA personnel,
while helping Italian authorities, "conduct [drug] investigations and
.. .exchange and develop intelligence."8 9
A significant limitation on the DEA's role in illegal drug traf-
ficking investigations in Italy is exemplified in the Mansfield Amend-
ment (Amendment) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.90 The
Amendment prohibits American law enforcement authorities from
being present at an arrest scene in a foreign country.91 As early as
1985, DEA officials were requesting a modification of this Amend-
ment to allow DEA (or other American government) authorities to
be present at the scene of an arrest of a suspected drug trafficker in
a foreign country.9 2
First, the DEA indicated that, in some foreign nations, and par-
ticularly in less developed countries, "the most efficient means of
transporting foreign officers to a remote location where a raid or
other enforcement activity is to take place is by U.S. aircraft or ves-
sel." ' This type of activity, however, would "invariably place a U.S.
enforcement officer at an arrest scene . . . in violation of the current
Mansfield restrictions."94 Thus, the Amendment, as it read in 1985,
placed an undue burden on American law enforcement authorities
who were not even intentionally attempting to be present at an arrest
scene but who were simply trying to get the foreign officers to places
designated for raids or other drug enforcement activities. By encour-
aging American authorities not to transport foreign officers to arrest
scenes (so the American authorities would not violate the Mansfield
Amendment), the Amendment undermined such arrests.
Second, DEA argued that the Amendment forced American au-
87. Security and Development Assistance-International Narcotics Control: Hearings
on S.381-27 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1056 (1984) [here-
inafter Security and Development Assistance] (statement of the Honorable Francis M. Mul-
len, Jr., Administrator, DEA).
88. Id. (statement of Senator Hawkins).
89. Id.
90. Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-226, § 481, 86 Stat. 20, 24 (1972).
The pertinent provision of the Mansfield Amendment is discussed in International Narcotics
Control Programs Review: Hearings on H. 381-57 Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1985) [hereinafter Int'l Narcotics Control Review].
91. Int'l Narcotics Control Review, supra note 90, at 124 (statement of Frank Monas-
tero, DEA).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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thorities to spend "an inordinate amount of time in planning to avoid
being present at an arrest scene. Even then, they [could not] always
anticipate all of the rapidly changing circumstances encountered in
an enforcement operation."9 Therefore, because American authori-
ties were constantly aware of the risks of violating the Amendment,
the Americans' only option was an "overcautious approach which re-
sults in loss of effectiveness." '96
Third, the Mansfield Amendment, as it read in 1985, severely
hampered the cooperative efforts of the two countries when the
American authorities could not be present at arrest scenes because
the foreign officers needed the Americans "to guide, advise or assist
. . . [them because they lacked the] expertise in criterical opera-
tional techniques. '"" Fourth, allowing DEA to be present at arrest
scenes would enable them to follow-up more quickly on "perishable
intelligence obtained by foreign officers in such situations." 8
Finally, foreign officials were likely to be left with a negative
impression of cooperative anti-narcotics-trafficking programs with
the United States if American authorities assisted the foreign gov-
ernment until immediately before the arrest, and then simply left. 9
Such negative feelings can be illustrated by the possibility that the
"prohibition [made] it appear as though . . . [Americans] agents
[were] asking host country officers to alone assume the risks in fur-
therance. of what are clearly joint objectives." '10
Congress most likely took these arguments into account when it
drafted the International Cooperation Act of 1989 (Act). 1 ' Al-
though the Act prohibits an American law enforcement authority,
from directly effecting an arrest in any foreign country as part
of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control ef-
forts, . . . it does permit, with the approval of the U.S. Chief of
Mission, a U.S. officer or employee to be present at the scene of
an arrest and to assist foreign officers who are effecting an
arrest.'0o
An American authority, however, may take direct action "to protect
life or safety if exigent circumstances arise which are unanticipated
and which pose an immediate threat to U.S. officers or employees,
officers or employees of a foreign government, or members of the
95. Id. at 125.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Int'l Cooperation Act, supra note 44.
102. Id. at 93, tit. III, ch. I, § 301, ch. 2(E), § 3281(a).
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public."103
If this piece of legislation is enacted into law, even in normal
nonexigent situations, American authorities would at least be al-
lowed to be present at an arrest scene and to assist the foreign offi-
cials. This ability will allow American authorities to transport for-
eign officials to remote locations for raids, to waste no valuable time
determining the manner in which to avoid an arrest scene, to assist
foreign officials who lack expertise in critical techniques, to complete
follow-up analysis on perishable items faster, and to create general
goodwill with the foreign countries. The benefits of this modification
of the Mansfield Amendment will help the United States not only
with its heroin trafficking problem with Italy but also with illegal
narcotics trafficking with other foreign nations.
D. Effectiveness of Italian-American Cooperative Efforts
According to a 1984 DEA report,
In the past 15 months it is estimated this flow [of heroin from
Italy to the eastern portion of the United States] has been de-
creased by 25 percent [from 80 percent]. The traditional Mafia
hierarchy in Sicily has disappeared-either hiding or killed in
fratricidal disputes. Between 1978 and 1983 ten operational her-
oin conversion labs were, seized in Italy. It is estimated that 2 to
3 labs presently exist, but they are not as sophisticated as those
previously seized. There have been hundred of prosecutions of
drug law violators throughout Italy, particularly in Sicily, and
approximately 80 percent of the major prosecutions resulted
partly from intelligence and assistance provided by DEA. There
has been a 98 to 99 percent conviction rate on the cases in which
DEA has been involved.1 0 4
Thus, narcotics trafficking from Italy in 1984 was substantially lower
than the 1978 level. 10 5 Furthermore, according to the 1988 Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Strategy Report, during the period of 1985
to 1988, "the quantity of heroin exported from Italy to the United
States has been reduced significantly.' 06
The paucity of recent statistics on the amount of heroin traffick-
ing between Italy and the United States raises two propositions.
First, due to limited resources, the United States has recently de-
cided to concentrate its drug-supply reduction efforts on other, more
103. Id.
104. Int'l Narcotics Control, supra note 6, at 187.
105. Id. at 188.
106. Worldwide Narcotics Review of the 1988 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report: Hearings on H.381-57 Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
64 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report) (statement of
David Westrate, Assistant Administrator for Operations, DEA).
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dangerous drug-source countries such as Columbia, Bolivia, and
Mexico. This proposition is very likely true because recent American
government initiatives to assist drug-source countries in combatting
the narcotics trafficking problem do not mention Italy as a country
needing more American assistance. 10 7 Second, the reduction of her-
oin transported from Italy to the United States must have been sig-
nificant enough for American government officials to conclude that
the current levels of such trafficking are too insignificant to include
in governmental reports. 10 8 Thus, because the reduction in heroin en-
tering the United States through the Sicilian Mafia connection has
been greatly reduced, the previously high level of American assis-
tance in Italy is perhaps no longer needed.
According to 1987 statistics, the amount of such heroin im-
ported into the United States over the past decade "is far less."' 1 9
The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
attributes such success to the historical "cooperation between the
U.S. government and the Italian government to reduce this particu-
lar form of drug importation and distribution. ""0 Specifically, Sena-
tor Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the Senate International Nar-
cotics Control Caucus, explains that the Pizza Connection Case
"could not have been investigated and prosecuted without an ex-
traordinary amount of cooperation between United -States law en-
forcement officials and officials from . .. Italy.""' Senator Biden
highlights the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the govern-
ments of the United States and Italy as making the high degree of
cooperation between the two countries possible." 2
Although there is no direct evidence linking the reduction of
heroin imports to the operation of the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, the innovative and stringent provisions of the Treaty must
have had some sort of positive effect on the heroin trafficking prob-
107. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 28. For example, the Assistant Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York Office reveals that "heroin importation in
New York City through the vehicle of the Sicilian Mafia has dropped off." Id. at 43.
Although Italy and the United States have made significant progress in combatting the
heroin trafficking problem over the past decade, the Sicilian Mafia remains "very active in the
importation, exportation," and production of heroin. 1988 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, supra note 106, at 64.
The Magistrate of Palermo, Italy stated that despite the excellent results achieved by the
United States and Italy in combatting the heroin trafficking problem by the middle of 1987, if
the two countries were to believe that they have completely defeated the Mafia, they would be
making "a serious error." Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 32. Thus, although the Ital-
ian and American governments have diminished much of the Mafia's heroin trafficking into
the United States, the Mafia continues to export heroin to the United States. Id. at 41.
110. Id. at 29.
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id.
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lem. For instance, although the United States has had the authority
to "extradite fugitives, including [American] citizens, to foreign
countries"11 for many years, the Italian-American treaty has given
the United States the ability to seek to have "its courts, at the re-
quest of a treaty partner [Italy], to compel the appearance of wit-
nesses from this country at the trial of such fugitives in the courts of
a treaty partner.""' Furthermore, although the United States has
also had the authority "to secure the extradition of fugitives from
foreign countries," 115 for many years, the Treaty now allows the
United States "to request those countries [for example, Italy] to
compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses from those coun-
tries at the trial of such fugitives in the United States."" 6 The un-
precedented stringent measure of this Treaty which allows for the
compulsion of witnesses for testimonial purposes must have had
some sort of deterrent effect on potential heroin traffickers. This
Treaty should continue to have such an effect in the future and could
lead, conceivably, to convictions of heroin traffickers as a result of
the testimony of a witness compelled to appear in court.
While there is no direct link between the Treaty and actual re-
duction of heroin trafficking between the United States and Italy,
some evidence exists which connects DEA support to the reduction
of heroin trafficking." 7 For example, the Italian Government, with
the assistance of DEA, "vigorously enforced the new anti-Mafia
laws" 8 which resulted in substantial prison terms for members of
leading Sicilian crime families, disrupted the entire Mafia hierarchy
in Sicily, and led to the pre-trial detention of many narcotics and
organized crime suspects."" 9 This particular combined Italian-
American effort has led to an approximated twenty-five percent re-
duction in the amount of heroin shipped from Italy to the eastern
portion of the United States by the mid-1980s.'20 Thus, the high
level of commitment between the Italian and American governments
substantially reduced the amount of heroin that the Sicilian Mafia
has been able to transport to the United States.
113. Executive Report, supra note 50, at 196-97.
114. Id. at 197.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See also supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
118. One such anti-Mafia law authorizes Italian law enforcement authorities to imprison
anyone who even associates with Mafia figures. See Security and Development Assistance,
supra note 87, at 1064.
119. Int'l Narcotics Control, supra note 6, at 121.
120. Id.
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IV. Using the Italian-American Cooperative-Effort Programs as a
Role Model for International Drug Trafficking Problems
A. Ineffectiveness of Present Programs
As Senator Alfonse D'Amato, Co-Chairman of the Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, revealed, in comparison with the
level of cooperation between Italy and the United States,
too many countries are not doing what they should be doing to
cooperate fully with us. Too many countries: 1) did not convict
or extradite to the United States a single major drug trafficker;
2) have no effective conspiracy laws; 3) seized only a tiny frac-
tion of the narcotics they produce; 4) actually increased their
production of narcotics; 5) signed no Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty with us; 6) failed to combat the corruption pervading
their governments; and 7) did not allow DEA agents to join
them in even a single law enforcement action, debrief a single
arrestee, have any access to informants, or in any way operate
within their borders. 12 1
As the above passage illustrates, to combat effectively the interna-
tional narcotics trafficking problem, the United States and foreign
countries must be able to work together. No one country can accom-
plish this job on its own. The following three examples show that the
United States has not been able to cross the very important thresh-
old of cooperation with several key drug-supplying countries.
1. Mexico.-Because the amount of narcotics transported out
of Mexico has increased tremendously since 1982, Mexico is now a
"major source of heroin and .. .a major transhipment point for
cocaine. ' United States Customs officials and other law enforce-
ment authorities who work along the United States-Mexico border
find little cooperation initiated or encouraged by the Mexican Gov-
ernment. 2' Occasional instances of cooperation between the two
countries usually involve the exchanging of information where one
side "provides information on a stolen car and in turn information is
given with respect to a bank robbery."' 4 According to William von
Raab, former United States Customs Service Commissioner,
"[t]here are no Custom officers who have brought to my attention
any noticeable or tangible cooperation between the law enforcement
officials at a working level in Mexico and Customs officials."' 12 5 De-
spite a drug trafficking problem in Mexico that is increasing at an
121. Int'l Security Threat, supra note 1, at 20.
122. Id. at 92.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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alarming rate, little effective cooperation, including a signed Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (Treaty) or an extradition treaty, 126 exists
between Mexico and the United States.
2. Panama.-Moreover, the "most sensitive and urgent of all
American attempts to negotiate a [Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty]
MLAT has been with Panama."' 27 Latin American drug traffickers
favor Panama as a "bank haven and money laundering center"'128 for
their illegal narcotics activities.2 9 Despite the obvious need for coop-
eration to resolve this problem, "Panamanian leaders have proved
highly resistant to any efforts to pierce their bank secrecy laws and
efforts to negotiate a treaty . . . [since 1985] have been sporadic at
best."' 30 Although Interpol' 3' has met with some limited success in
organizing an agreement in which all signing countries would allow
an international narcotics trafficking exception to their bank secrecy
laws, such a treaty will not come into force for many years. 32
Thus, as illustrated by the Mexican and Panamanian situations,
little cooperative effort between these countries and the United
States exists despite the need for some effective measures to reduce
the international drug trafficking problem. Furthermore, the Mexi-
can and Panamanian situations are not the only instances of lack of
cooperation by the United States and foreign countries. According to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Task Force on Interna-
tional Narcotics Control, many "international narcotics control pro-
grams overseas are not working because of lack of cooperation [due
to] .. .corruption in the host government . . .[and/or] problems in
management on the United States side."' 33
3. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.-The United Nations Conven-
tion Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances3 which was "adopted at an international conference . . . in
Vienna in November and December 1988" and which has been
signed by sixty nations seeks "to establish a comprehensive set of
laws and guidelines for a concerted and more effective effort on an
126. Id. at 4.
127. Nadelmann, supra note 46, at 501.
128. Id. at 502.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Interpol stands for the International Criminal Police Organization, which serves as
a "coordinating group for international law enforcement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 733
(5th ed. 1979).
132. Nadelmann, supra note 46, at 502.
133. Foreign Aid Sanctions Against Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations: CRS
Seminar on S.940-5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
134. Convention, supra note I.
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international basis to combat illicit trafficking."' 6 Although the mo-
tives behind the Convention are certainly commendable, the signa-
tory countries failed to draft the stringent measures needed to effec-
tively combat the international drug problem.136
Two particular provisions of the Convention leave loopholes
which are detrimental to the Convention's purpose of establishing
effective weapons to combat international narcotics trafficking.'37
First, article 7 of the Convention mandates that the signatory parties
must give each other the "widest measure of mutual legal assistance
in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to
criminal offenses." 38 Despite this requirement in article 7, the Con-
vention creates a loophole by granting the signatory countries the
power only to encourage, and not to compel, both expert and lay
witnesses to testify in criminal proceedings.' 39 As opposed to the
Italian-American Treaty which compels witnesses from either coun-
try to testify in the other country,'" the Convention simply gives the
witnesses the opportunity not to testify. 4' This provision has the po-
tential of completely destroying the prosecution's cases if key wit-
nesses simply choose not to appear in court.
Furthermore, article 32 of the Convention, which deals with dis-
pute settlements, provides another loophole." 2 In "a dispute relating
to the interpretation or application of this Convention, " 3 signatory
nations are required to attempt negotiation and, if that fails, to refer
the problem to the International Court of Justice for a ruling.' 14
Under paragraph 4 of article 32, the nations, upon signature or rati-
fication, may elect not to be bound by the requirement."'5 The more
135. Id., letter of transmittal, at iii.
136. See, e.g., supra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. See also Convention, supra note I, at
1-2.
138. Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, para. 1. Article 7, para. 2 provides that "[miutual
legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may be requested for any of the
following purposes:"
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
(c) Executing searches and seizures;
(d) Examining objects and sites;
(e) Providing information and evidentiary items;
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records,
including bank, financial, corporate or business records;
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds, property, instrumentalities or other
things for evidentiary purposes.
Id.
139. Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, paras. 4 and 18.
140. See supra notes 50-80 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142. Convention, supra note 1, art. 32.
143. Id., para. 1.
144. Id., para. 2.
145. Id., para. 4.
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states that elect not to be bound by the International Court's deci-
sions, the more potential problems will occur because disputes over
interpretation and application of this Convention may very well re-
main unsettled and thereby cause feelings of ill-will to develop be-
tween the disputing countries. This problem could ultimately lead to
less cooperation among the nations in international drug trafficking
investigations which would be detrimental to combatting the interna-
tional drug trafficking problem.
Despite these inherent problems in the Convention, the agree-
ment does contain some strict standards for international drug traf-
ficking investigations. In particular, article 5 of the Convention re-
quires adopting nations "to enable their courts or other competent
authorities to order the production or seizure of bank, financial and
commercial records necessary to trace, identify, seize and forfeit pro-
ceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking." 14 As opposed to the
Panamanian Government which until recently, has upheld its bank
secrecy laws even in international drug trafficking investigations,14
the Convention specifically stipulates that no signatory nation can
refuse to comply with the confiscation requirements on the basis of
its bank secrecy laws.'4 8 The Convention, therefore, contains some
strict measures designed to effectively combat the international nar-
cotics trafficking crisis. The Convention, however, does not do as
much as it should to solve the problem.
B. The Need to Use the Italian-American Program as a Role
Model
The inherent problems in the Mexican and Panamanian situa-
tions as well as the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances illustrate the need
for a truly effective program which can reduce the amount of narcot-
ics transported on an international level. Specifically, the Mutual Le-
gal Assistance Treaty (Treaty) between the United States and Italy
should serve as the role model for the United States when it is at-
tempting to work with other foreign countries in reducing the
amount of illegal narcotics entering the United States from these
nations. The Treaty with Italy contains stringent measures, in partic-
ular the compulsion-of-witnesses and forfeiture clauses, which can
effectively deter drug traffickers.14 9 In order for the United States to
adopt strict Treaties with other foreign countries, the United States
and these nations must be willing to exert the degree of cooperation
146. Convention, supra note I, art. 5, para. 3.
147. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
148. Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 3.
149. See supra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
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that the United States and Italy enjoy. Without a high level of coop-
eration such as is present between the United States and Italy, a
strict Treaty will not be possible because the signatory countries will
not be able to work together.
Several experts in the international narcotics field believe that
the Treaty and overall high degree of cooperation between the
United States and Italy should serve as a role model. Chairman
Rangel, leader of the 1984 United States delegation to Italy, ex-
pressed his desire to see the Italian-American narcotics trafficking
reduction programs, such as the MLAT between the United States
and Italy, "serve as a model for other nations to follow. ' 150 Further-
more, Italian Foreign Minister Guilio Andreotti advised that other
countries should follow the Italian-American example of sharing in-
formation on international narcotics trafficking.' 51
Through a high level of cooperation and a strict Treaty between
the two countries, the Italian-American program achieved significant
success in reducing the amount of heroin transported from Italy to
the United States. The United States does not enjoy such coopera-
tion and does not have the use of such a strict bilateral agreement
with many other foreign countries. Because of this fact and the un-
derstanding that these other foreign countries have drug trafficking
problems increasing at an alarming rate, these other foreign nations
and the United States should adopt the Italian-American model.
V. Conclusion
Though predicting the extent of the international narcotics traf-
ficking problem in the future may be speculative, the drug problem
will certainly continue to grow unless the international community
bands together to create effective and strict treaties designed to in-
crease the probability of convicting known drug traffickers. If these
illegal narcotics traffickers know that upon being caught transporting
drugs they will be convicted and severely punished, they might stop
their illegal activities altogether. Even if such offenders continue to
sell drugs and are actually convicted and imprisoned for their activi-
ties, then at least when they are in prison, they will not be distribut-
ing drugs. Either way, drugs will be removed from the streets. Such
treaties, however, will not come about overnight. The United States
and other foreign countries should work together in all phases of the
investigation process-investigating, locating, arresting, and prose-
cuting drug traffickers.
The success that the American and Italian governments have
150. Int'l Narcotics Control, supra note 6, at 190.
151. Id. at 191.
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achieved in significantly reducing the amount of heroin that the Si-
cilian Mafia previously had been able to transport to the United
States lends credibility to the Treaty with Italy as well as to the high
degree of cooperative efforts exerted by officials from both countries.
The importance of reducing the trafficking of drugs worldwide de-
mands that countries work together, like the Italian and American
Governments have, in all phases of an investigation. The goal of re-
ducing narcotics consumption and international drug trafficking can
only be accomplished by strict international agreements and underly-
ing cooperative efforts.
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